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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2003 ME 144
Docket: Pen-03-364
Argued: November 7, 2003
Decided: December
10, 2003
Panel: CLIFFORD,
RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
v.
LEVY, J.
mptyParas]>
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Maine Health
is a nonprofit corporation that provides an integrated healthcare delivery
system in Maine. Medical Mutual
insured Maine Health under a claims-made insurance policy. In October 2001, the FTC contacted
Maine Health by letter and telephone indicating that it was conducting a
nonpublic investigation to determine whether Maine Health and others violated
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000), by engaging in an
effort to restrain trade. The
letter requested Maine Health to voluntarily provide information and documents;
specified that the FTC was not then charging or accusing Maine Health of any
wrongdoing; and indicated that the FTC may investigate "further" after Maine
Health's "prompt submission" of the information and documents requested.
[¶3] Maine Health
immediately notified Medical Mutual of the FTC investigation and requested
Medical Mutual to defend it under the policy. Maine Health subsequently sent a written demand for
policy coverage and reimbursement for all costs incurred, past and prospective,
in connection with the investigation.
Medical Mutual responded by denying coverage for the claim because, in
its view, the FTC's notice of investigation did not constitute a claim for
damages and was not within the policy's definition of a "claim." Maine Health
filed this action seeking damages for a breach of contract and a declaratory
judgment.
[¶4] The
Superior Court granted Maine Health's motion for a summary judgment and denied
Medical Mutual's cross motion for a summary judgment. The summary judgment concluded with a direction for a docket
entry stating, "[Maine Health's] Motion for Summary Judgment is granted . . .
[and Medical Mutual's] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied." The court did not indicate whether it
was granting judgment to Maine Health on its count for breach of contract, its
count seeking a declaratory judgment, or both, and was also silent regarding
any amount of money damages awarded.
[¶5] Following the
entry of the summary judgment, Medical Mutual filed a motion to reconsider
or amend the judgment. The
court denied the motion, stating, "the court declines to amend or
alter its earlier ruling, but will amplify it as follows: the Defendant
shall have the right to recoup any costs or expenses incurred in defending
the claim(s) which are later determined to be excluded by the express
terms of the policy." Medical Mutual appeals from the summary
judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶6] We do not reach the merits of this appeal because the summary judgment does not resolve all pending claims and is not a final judgment. M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1); see also Donald G. Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice § 303(a), at 149 (2003) ("The most common basis for dismissal of appeals under the final judgment rule is a failure to resolve all pending claims."). The summary judgment does not address whether the judgment awarded is on both counts of the complaint or is only a partial judgment. If it is only partial, the summary judgment does not provide direction as to further proceedings. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(d) (providing that if the case is not fully adjudicated on the motion, the court's order shall "direct[] such further proceedings in the action as are just.").
[¶7] In addition, the subsequent order denying Medical Mutual's motion for reconsideration or to amend the judgment refers to a "later" determination of Medical Mutual's right to recoup costs or expenses, which suggests the possibility of further proceedings as a predicate to a final determination of Medical Mutual's obligations under the policy. [1] Considered together, the summary judgment and the subsequent order do not fully set forth the declaration of the parties' rights or duties as is required of declaratory judgments. See York Mut. Ins. Co. of Me. v. Mooers, 415 A.2d 564, 566 (Me. 1980); Murphy v. Maddaus, 2002 ME 24, ¶ 13, 789 A.2d 1281, 1285 ("[T]he consummating effect of an order, rather than whether it is nominally called a 'judgment' identifies an appealable final judgment.").
[¶8] Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed because we cannot
determine from the summary judgment that it resolves all pending claims and is
a final judgment.
The entry is:
Appeal dismissed.
________________________
Attorneys for plaintiff:
Michael R. Gottfried, Esq. (orally)
Katherine Young Fergus, Esq.
Gregory A. Brodek, Esq.
Duane Morris LLP
88 Hammond Street, Suite 500
Bangor, ME 04401
Attorneys for defendant:
James D. Poliquin, Esq. (orally)
Christopher C. Taintor, Esq.
Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLC
P O Box 4600
Portland, ME 04112-4600
[1]
At oral argument, counsel for Maine Health indicated
that, subsequent to the court's entry of the summary judgment, Maine
Health entered into a consent agreement with the FTC in which it admitted
no wrongdoing or liability, and no damages were imposed.
This development may be relevant to the right of recoupment
recognized by the court in its order denying the motion to reconsider
or amend the judgment.