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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2005 ME 5
Docket: Cum-03-717
Argued: September 21, 2004
Decided: January 10,
2005
Panel: SAUFLEY,
C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
THOMAS
C. REGA
CALKINS, J.
[¶1] Thomas C. Rega appeals from the judgment entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Cole, J.) after a jury trial convicting him of kidnapping, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 301(1)(A)(3) (Class A) (1983),[1] and gross sexual assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(A) (Class A) (Supp. 2001).[2] Rega contends that the trial court erroneously admitted out-of-court statements Rega's wife made to the police and another witness, and he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Rega also challenges the admission of expert testimony concerning his mental state. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Rega's convictions arose from events on July 28, 2002, at the Freeport home he shared with his wife and their daughter. The previous night, the wife had stayed at her mother's home in Massachusetts where she received telephone calls from Rega threatening to kill her and her family. The wife called the Freeport police on the morning of July 28 and asked that Rega be arrested. The police told the wife to come to the police station and make a report. The wife drove to Maine, dropped her daughter off at a friend's house, and after checking to make certain that Rega was not at their Freeport house, she went there to pick up a few items.
[¶3] Rega arrived
while the wife was in the yard of their home. He took her by the arm and into the house. The wife had turned on an audio
recording device before Rega arrived and some of their conversation was
recorded. In the house, Rega
became enraged and accused his wife of cheating with another man and conspiring
with police to ruin his life. On
the recording, the wife told Rega to put down the knife, and he can be heard screaming
and threatening to kill the wife and her family. Rega told the wife that she was his hostage, and she did not
think that she could leave.
[¶4] The wife
performed oral sex on Rega while he instructed her on what to do. Rega had tied her hands and one foot,
but in the bathroom she untied herself.
She dove out a window and, partially undressed, got to her car. She drove down a dead-end road and ran
into a nearby flower shop. The
entire incident at the house lasted approximately two hours.
[¶5] In the flower
shop, the wife blurted to the shop owner, "I've been held hostage, lock the
doors, he'll kill us both." She
was bleeding and said that she had been stabbed. The owner gave her his shirt, sent her to the cellar, locked
the door, and called 911. The wife
huddled under a tarp until the police arrived, about five to eight minutes
later. A police officer reassured
her that she was safe, and she came out from under the tarp. She was crying, shaking, bleeding, and
inconsolable. A police officer
asked her what had happened, and he recorded their conversation. Another officer was also present and
asked her questions as well.
[¶6] The wife told
police that Rega had been holding her hostage and had threatened to slit her
throat. In response to a police
question concerning the location of her daughter, she said her daughter was at
a friend's house in Westbrook. The
wife then told police how she had escaped from Rega. The police asked how she got a cut on her head, and she said
it came from the knife Rega held.
She said that Rega made her perform sexual acts while he held a knife to
her head and threatened to put the knife through her brain. She then told police that she was
worried about her daughter, and, in response to questions from the police, she
described her husband's vehicles and provided a better description of her
daughter's location. After more
discussion about her escape, the wife said that Rega cut her with a knife, held
the knife to her throat, and told her that he was holding her hostage. She again said that Rega sexually
assaulted her and stated "he made [her] perform oral sex with a knife to [her]
head."
[¶7] Rega was
indicted and tried on several offenses, including kidnapping and gross sexual
assault.[3] At trial, the wife testified as did the
shop owner and the two police officers who had interviewed the wife after the
incident. The audio recording of the incident at the house was admitted in
evidence.
[¶8] The recording
made by the police of the interview with the wife at the flower shop was the
subject of a pretrial ruling. Rega
objected to the entire recording on the ground that it was hearsay. The State argued that the entire
recording, approximately twenty-three minutes in length, was admissible as an
excited utterance, pursuant to M.R. Evid. 803(2). The court ruled that the first portion of the recording
would be admitted as an excited utterance, but it was inadmissible from the
point that the wife answered questions about the location of her daughter. At that point she became calm, and her
statements thereafter were not the result of the stress of excitement.
[¶9] During the
direct examination of one of the police officers, the prosecutor asked the
officer if he remembered the point in the interview with the wife when he asked
the whereabouts of the daughter, and the officer answered affirmatively. When asked what the wife had said
before that point, the officer stated that she said Rega had held her against
her will, threatened to kill her, and made her perform oral sex with a knife to
her throat. The prosecutor then
asked if the officer remembered anything else that the wife had told him, and
he answered that she had said she was concerned about her daughter. Rega objected on the ground that the
examination was beyond the scope of the excited utterance. The court ruled that the officer could
relate the interview up to the point that the daughter's location was
discussed. Rega did not move to strike any of the testimony that had been given
nor did he request a curative instruction.
[¶10] The shop owner,
who overheard the police interview with the wife, was asked by the prosecutor
what the wife had said to the police.
Rega objected, and the court reiterated the ruling it had made earlier
on the extent of the excited utterance.
The court stated that it would allow the shop owner's testimony up to
the point of the cut-off line, referring to the point at which the wife
answered police questions about the location of the daughter. After several failed attempts to find
out if the shop owner could distinguish what the wife said before the cut-off
line and after it, the prosecutor went on to other subjects. During redirect examination, the
prosecutor asked the shop owner if he heard the wife mention the sexual assault
to the police. When the shop owner
responded affirmatively, the prosecutor asked if he remembered whether that
discussion came before or after the wife's statements about the location of the
daughter. The shop owner
responded, "I believe that was after . . . [she] was concerned about her daughter,
very concerned about her daughter and she did tell the police that she had been
raped." Rega did not object or
move to strike.
[¶11] After the
shop owner had testified and during the testimony of the police officer who had
recorded the interview, the prosecutor requested to play the recording of the
police interview with the wife for the jury. At that point Rega's attorney informed the court that he had
consulted with Rega and that they had changed their minds about wanting to keep
the recording from the jury. Rega
affirmatively requested that the entire tape recording be played for the jury
and the court acceded to this request.
After the jury listened to the tape, the prosecutor offered the tape
itself into evidence, and Rega again stated that he had no objection.
[¶12] During the
wife's testimony, the prosecutor asked her several questions about a written
statement she had given to the police.
When asked whether she agreed to have oral sex with Rega, the wife
answered that she was not opposed to it and thought it would calm him
down. She testified that she had
not been feeling particularly amorous but that having sex with him was a better
option than others. She testified
that she was not tied at the time of the oral sex and that Rega told her what
to do. The prosecutor then asked
about the statement she had written for the police. She admitted that her written statement said that Rega had
tied her and made her perform oral sex with a knife in his hands. Rega did not object, move to strike, or
request a limiting instruction.
[¶13] In his
opening statement, Rega's attorney told the jury that Rega's mental health
would be an issue in the case, that the evidence would show he had a major
psychotic episode and a break with reality. In fact, Rega had been examined prior to trial by a forensic
psychologist and psychiatrist under the auspices of the State Forensic Service,
pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 101-B(1), (2) (2003). At trial, the psychologist who performed the examination was
called by the State. Rega objected
to the witness on the ground that the defense of abnormal state of mind had not
yet been generated. The objection
was overruled, and the State's expert testified that in his opinion Rega did
not have any diagnosis for mental illness on the date of the offenses, and that
although Rega was intoxicated, the intoxication did not impair his ability to
recognize what he was doing. In
the State expert's opinion Rega was aware of the consequences of his actions
and was acting intentionally.[4]
[¶14] Rega was
convicted of gross sexual assault and kidnapping.[5] The court imposed concurrent sentences
of twenty and ten years respectively, suspending all but fifteen years, and six
years of probation.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Out-of-Court
Statements
[¶15] Rega contends
that the wife's out-of-court statements should not have been admitted. Specifically, he argues that it was
error to admit the following: (1) the recording made by the police of the
interview with the wife; (2) the police officer's testimony that the wife told
him that Rega held a knife to her throat and made her perform sexual acts; (3)
the shop owner's testimony that he overheard the wife tell the police that she
had been raped; and (4) the wife's testimony about her written statement to the
police.
1. Recording of the
Police Interview of the Wife
[¶16] Although Rega
argues that the recording of the police interview with the wife was
inadmissible, he specifically withdrew his objection to the recording. He made an express request that the
recording be played to the jury.
He now contends that he was forced to request that the jury hear the
recording in its entirety to mitigate the effect of the wife's out-of-court
statements to the police and the shop owner regarding the sexual assault. However, Rega did not make that
explanation to the trial court and has not explained to us how playing the
entire recording to the jury would mitigate the other out-of-court statements.
[¶17] Rega's
withdrawal of his objection and his affirmative request that the recording be
played for the jury is akin to a stipulation that it was admissible. When a party affirmatively agrees to a
court action, that party has failed to preserve the action for appellate
review. Med. Care Dev. v.
Bryler Corp., 634 A.2d 1296, 1299 (Me.
1993). The same is true when a
party affirmatively requests that evidence be presented to the jury. We do not review alleged errors that
resulted from a party's trial strategy.
Aucella v. Town of Winslow, 628
A.2d 120, 123 (Me. 1993). Rega has
failed to preserve for appeal the admissibility of the recording of the police
interview with the wife.
2. Police Officer's
Testimony About the Wife's Statements
[¶18] Rega made
objections to the testimony of the police officer about the wife's statements
to him regarding the sexual encounter, and the admissibility of the statements
is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See State v. Witham, 1997 ME 77,
¶ 10, 692 A.2d 930, 934. This
testimony was offered prior to the playing of the recording of the police
interview with the wife. At the
time the statements were offered they should not have been admitted because
they were not part of the wife's excited utterance. The statements about sex were made after the police asked
her the whereabouts of her daughter.
The court ruled that it was at that point in the discussion where the
wife had calmed down.
Unfortunately, neither attorney was helpful to the court in pointing
out, at side bar, where the statements about sex appeared in the context of the
court's ruling on the excited utterance.
[¶19] However, the
error in admitting the statements was harmless because it is highly probable
that the error did not affect the verdict. See Witham, 1997 ME 77, ¶ 16, 692 A.2d at 935. There was other evidence regarding the
sexual assault, even without all of the wife's out-of-court statements. First, there was the recording made at
the house on which Rega was angry, screaming, and threatening to kill the
wife. Also on the recording were
Rega's statements that he was holding the wife as his hostage. The wife is heard telling him to put
down the knife. Second, the wife
testified about the oral sex, describing Rega as instructing her on what to
do. She testified that performing
oral sex was the better option available to her. She also related to the jury his threats to kill her. When the prosecutor asked her to
describe what she meant by oral sex, the wife initially responded "he made me
put . . ." before she stopped herself.
The reasonable inference from the recording at
the house and the wife's testimony was that if she did not engage in sex with
him, he would carry out his threat of killing her.
3. Shop Owner's
Testimony About the Wife's Statements
[¶20] During the
direct examination of the shop owner, the prosecutor asked him a question about
what he had heard the wife say to the police. Rega's objection to this question was sustained. After unsuccessful attempts at getting
the shop owner to distinguish between statements made during the wife's excited
utterances and those made when she had calmed down, the prosecutor gave
up. Later, on redirect
examination, when the prosecutor asked the shop owner whether he had heard the
wife talk to the police about the "rape or sexual assault," the shop owner
testified that he heard her say that she had been raped. Rega made no objection or motion to
strike.
[¶21] Because there
was no objection to testimony about the wife's statements during the redirect
examination, we review the admissibility of the statement for obvious
error. M.R. Crim. P. 52(b); M.R.
Evid. 103(a), (e).
Under the obvious error standard, we review the
admissibility of controverted testimony only when the error complained of is so
highly prejudicial and so taints the proceeding as virtually to deprive the
aggrieved party of a fair trial.
In making such a determination we apply our best judgment to all the
circumstances of the case at hand to determine whether inadmissible evidence
received at trial was in its probable effect upon the jury a seriously
prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.
State v. Profenno, 516 A.2d 201, 203 (Me. 1986) (citations, quotation marks,
and ellipses omitted).
[¶22] There was no
obvious error in the admission of this testimony. As stated above, there was sufficient evidence from the
wife's in-court testimony and from the recording made at the house for a jury
to conclude that Rega committed the gross sexual assault.
4. Wife's Testimony
About Her Written Statement
[¶23] Likewise, the
wife's testimony about her written statement to the police was not objected to,
and it is reviewed, therefore, for obvious error. M.R. Crim. P. 52(b); M.R. Evid. 103(a), (e). The testimony about the written
statement was hearsay because it was offered to prove the truth that it
asserted, that is, that the wife was forced to perform a sexual act at
knifepoint. M.R. Evid.
801(c). It was not offered for the
limited purpose of demonstrating that the wife's memory had diminished or for
credibility purposes. See State
v. Benner, 654 A.2d 435, 436-37 (Me.
1995). The testimony about the
written statement did not meet the requirements of M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1), for a
prior statement by a witness, because it was not under oath or a statement of
identification. Nor did it meet
the requirement for recorded recollection in M.R. Evid. 803(5), because the
wife did not testify that she was unable to recall the incident.
[¶24] However, the
admission of the statement did not produce manifest injustice. By the time the wife testified, the
jury had heard the recording of her statements to the police. The jury had also heard the recording
made at the house described above.
In addition, the wife testified to Rega's threats and his instructing
her on what to do during the sexual act.
As stated above, the reasonable inference from her in-court testimony
and the recording made at the house was that if she did not engage in sex with
him, he would fulfill his threat to kill her. The court did not obviously err in admitting the wife's
testimony regarding her written statement.
B. Sufficiency
of the Evidence
[¶25] Rega first
argues that because all of the wife's out-of-court statements to the police and
the shop owner regarding the sexual assault are inadmissible, the evidence was
insufficient for a conviction on gross sexual assault. As stated above, even without
the wife's out-of-court statements, the jury could have reasonably inferred
from her testimony and from the recording of the incident at the house that the
wife submitted to Rega's sexual act by compulsion.
[¶26] Because there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to convict Rega on the gross sexual assault charge, there was
sufficient evidence of the kidnapping.
The wife's testimony and the recording of the events at the house
demonstrate that Rega restrained his wife and would not let her leave. While he was restraining her he
subjected her to the gross sexual assault, and thus, the jury could infer that
he restrained her with the intent to commit the sexual assault. Furthermore, there was evidence that
Rega restrained the wife with the intent to inflict bodily injury on her. The recording demonstrated that several
times the wife asked Rega to put down the knife and that Rega made numerous
threats to kill her. This was
enough for the jury to reasonably infer that Rega intended to inflict bodily
injury on the wife, whether or not he actually did inflict injury. The shop owner testified, without
objection, that when the wife first arrived at his store, she said that she had
been stabbed. In addition, the
police saw the cut on her head, and she had injuries on her hands. There was sufficient evidence to
convict Rega on both the gross sexual assault and kidnapping charges.
C. Testimony
by the State's Psychological Expert
[¶27] Rega argues
several issues arising from the testimony of the State's expert forensic
psychologist. Although Rega
objected to the testimony, he did so solely on the ground that the psychologist
should not be allowed to testify as to Rega's state of mind because no evidence
generating the defense of abnormal state of mind had been admitted. Rega made no other objections of
the psychologist's testimony.
[¶28] Rega first argues that the court erred
in admitting the psychologist's opinion that Rega did not have an abnormal
condition of mind at the time of the offenses. He contends this was error because the defense of abnormal
condition of mind had not been raised at the time the psychologist testified
and was not relevant. A relevancy
determination is reviewed for clear error. Ames v. Ames, 2003 ME 60,
¶ 13, 822 A.2d 1201, 1206.
[¶29] The pertinent statute states: "Evidence
of an abnormal condition of the mind may raise a reasonable doubt as to the
existence of a required culpable state of mind." 17-A M.R.S.A. § 38 (1983). Rega's argument that the abnormal condition of mind had not
been raised at the time the State's expert testified goes only to the
kidnapping charge because the crime of gross sexual assault does not require a
culpable state of mind.[6] See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(A).
[¶30] Rega's opening statement alerted the jury that Rega's mental state was an issue in the case. In addition, on cross-examination of Rega's wife, Rega asked questions regarding Rega's mental health history and hospitalizations, and she testified about his delusions of a conspiracy against him. Thus, in his opening statement and cross-examination, Rega opened the door to evidence about his mental condition. He made his mental state relevant. The court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in determining that Rega had raised the issue of his state of mind and in allowing the psychologist to give his opinion on the subject.[7]
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Attorneys for State:
Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney
Julia A. Sheridan, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally)
142 Federal Street
Portland, ME 04101
Attorney for defendant:
Mary A. Davis, Esq. (orally)
Tisdale & Davis, P.A.
P O Box 572
Portland, ME 04112
[1] The version of section 301 in effect on July 28, 2002, when the events in this case took place, reads, in part:
1. A person is guilty of kidnapping if either:
A. He knowingly restrains another person with the intent to
. . . .
(3) inflict bodily injury upon him or subject him to conduct defined as criminal in chapter 11 [sex offenses].
17-A M.R.S.A. § 301 (1983), amended by P.L 2001, ch. 383, § 26 (effective Jan. 31, 2003) (current version at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 301 (1983 & Supp. 2004)).
[2] The version of section 253(1)(A) in effect on July 28, 2002, reads, in part:
1. A person is guilty of gross sexual assault if that person engages in a sexual act with another person and:
A. The other person submits as a result of compulsion, as defined in section 251, subsection 1, paragraph E[.]
17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(A) (Supp. 2001), amended by P.L 2001 ch. 383, §§ 14-20 (effective Jan. 31, 2003) (current version at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253 (1983 & Supp. 2004)).
According to section 251(1)(E),
"Compulsion" means the use of physical force, a threat to use physical force or a combination thereof that makes a person unable to physically repel the actor or produces in that person a reasonable fear that death, serious bodily injury or kidnapping might be imminently inflicted upon that person or another human being.
"Compulsion" as defined in this paragraph places no duty upon the victim to resist the actor.
17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(E) (Supp. 2004).
[3] In addition to the kidnapping and gross sexual assault charges that are the subject of this appeal, the indictment also charged Rega with criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 209 (Class B) (1983); assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 207(1) (Class C) (1983), repealed and replaced by P.L. 2001, ch. 383 § 10 (effective January 31, 2003) (current version at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 207(1)(A) (Supp. 2004)); and two counts of terrorizing, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 210(1)(A) (Class C) (Supp. 2001), amended by P.L. 2001, ch. 383 § 11 (effective January 31, 2003) (current version at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 210(1)(A) (Supp. 2004)). Rega was also charged with tampering with a witness, 17‑A M.R.S.A. § 454(1)(B)(2) (Class B) (Supp. 2001), amended by P.L. 2001, ch. 383 § 63 (effective January 31, 2003) (current version at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 454(1)(B)(2) (Supp. 2004)), but it was dismissed by the State before trial.
[4]
Two experts were called by Rega to testify:
another psychologist and the psychiatrist who had performed the 15
M.R.S.A. § 101-B(1), (2) examinations.
The former testified that Rega suffered from a personality
disorder, was having a delusional episode on the day of the incident,
and his delusion strongly influenced his ability to form intent. The psychiatrist testified that Rega's mental state impaired
his ability to act rationally and effectively.
[5] The jury also found Rega guilty on the four other Class B and C charges. No appeal has been taken from those convictions.
[6]
The offense of kidnapping requires that
the defendant act "knowingly."
17-A M.R.S.A § 301(1)(A).
In contrast, the statute defining the offense of gross sexual
assault does not mention a culpable state of mind. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253; see State v. Saucier, 421 A.2d 57, 59 (Me. 1980).
[7]
Although Rega has argued several other
issues concerning the State expert's testimony, they are reviewed
for obvious error because he did not object on the grounds he argues
to us. See State v. Profenno, 516 A.2d 201, 202-03 (Me. 1986) (reviewing for obvious
error the defendant's claim that the evidence was hearsay where objection
at trial was made on other ground). None of the issues rise to the level of obvious error, and
none merit discussion.