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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2005 ME 87
Docket: Sag-04-11
Argued: April 26, 2005
Decided: June 30,
2005
Panel: SAUFLEY,
C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, and LEVY, JJ.
STATE
OF MAINE
v.
OLLAND
REESE
DANA, J.
[¶1]
Olland Reese appeals from a judgment of conviction for murder, 17‑A M.R.S.A.
§ 201(1)(A) (1983),[1]
entered in the Superior Court (Sagadahoc County, Warren, J.) following a jury trial. His sentence was forty-seven years. Reese contends, inter alia, that the
court erred by excluding certain alternative suspect evidence. We disagree and affirm the trial
court's judgment.[2]
I. Background
[¶2] On
May 29, 2002, after Cody Green had not been seen or heard from for three days,
her mother reported to the Brunswick Police that she was missing. The police opened an investigation and
interviewed many witnesses including Reese; his girlfriend, Kara McGinnis; and
Trudy Bither, Reese's mother. The
police also interviewed Phil Wilkins, a taxicab driver, and learned that he had
dropped Cody off at the house where Reese lived with his mother, on May
26. As far as the police could
determine, this was the last time Cody was seen alive.
[¶3]
Cody's body was found a month later buried in a shallow grave in the
woods behind the Bither house.
Reese was charged and tried for her murder. Based on the evidence admitted at trial, the jury could have
found Reese guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the following
circumstantial evidence. Reese was
alone at the house around the time Cody was dropped off by Wilkins. The police discovered Cody's blood on a
futon and on a wall in Bither's house, and her DNA was found on a hatchet. Based on the autopsy results, Cody was
hit on the head once or twice with an object that could have been the
hatchet. Cody's wrists were tied
with duct tape, similar to duct tape found near the bloodstained futon in the
house. A fiber on a sheet found wrapped
around Cody's head was similar in composition to the fabric covering the same
futon. The night before Cody
disappeared, Reese and Kara slept on the sheet that was found wrapped around
Cody's head. Reese knew certain
information about the condition of Cody's body before that information was
public. Finally, when questioned
by the police about his whereabouts on the day Cody disappeared, and whether
she had stopped by his house that day, Reese gave multiple, inconsistent
accounts.
[¶4] Prior to trial, the State moved to
exclude alternative suspect evidence that it anticipated Reese would offer at
trial. At a hearing on the motion,
Reese offered Chris Brawn as a primary alternative suspect. Reese argued that because Brawn had
been indicted for raping Cody, he had a motive to kill her, and, indeed, the
indictment was dismissed after her death.
Reese also offered Alicia Brewer, who would testify that Cody hid from
Brawn when she saw him shopping the day before she disappeared. Reese argued that this shopping
encounter provided Brawn with sufficient opportunity to follow and kill
Cody. Additionally, Reese offered
that Sierra Riel, Cody's stepsister, would testify that Brawn's girlfriend,
Megan Cochran, said that she wanted to beat Cody to death. Reese argued that Cochran's threat not
only makes her an alternative suspect, but also points to Brawn as an
alternative suspect.
[¶5] Reese offered Tyler Swisher as a third
alternative suspect. After Cody's
disappearance, but prior to the discovery of her body, Swisher wrote a letter
to his cousin at the Long Creek Youth Center. The cousin, who was Brawn's half brother, was present at the
time Brawn allegedly raped Cody and was also a friend of Cody's. After receiving the letter, the cousin
tore off and disposed of the portion of the letter that apparently addressed
Cody's death. He then discussed
the letter with two youth center officers, who subsequently filed
reports about the conversations.
According to the officers, the boy told them that the letter said that
Cody was dead. Neither officer,
however, saw the letter.
[¶6] Prior to trial, the police interviewed
both the recipient of the letter and its author. Both denied any conclusive knowledge of Cody's death prior
to the discovery of her body. The
recipient stated that Swisher had merely assumed she might be dead. Swisher stated that he recalled writing
that Cody might be dead because she was missing.
[¶7] At the hearing, the court provisionally
excluded evidence relating to Swisher and the cousin on hearsay grounds. The court, however, reserved decision
on the evidence relating to Brawn for trial. At trial, Reese renewed his motion to admit alternative
suspect evidence concerning Brawn. The court stated that it wanted to limit
the evidence to avoid a trial within a trial on the alternative
suspect issue. The parties
eventually agreed that if the Brawn indictment, its dismissal, and Brewer's
testimony were admitted, further court papers regarding Brawn would not come
in. Reese made it clear, however,
that by agreeing to this, he was not waiving his right to offer other testimony
supporting his alternative suspect theory.
[¶8] Ruling upon Reese's offer of additional
alternative suspect evidence, the court excluded Reil's testimony about
Cochran's threat as hearsay and reaffirmed its decision to exclude testimony
concerning the Swisher letter. The
court also excluded all further inquiry into Brawn's whereabouts on the weekend
Cody disappeared on the basis that it was speculative. Reese did not make further offers of
proof and did not attempt to present Cochran as a witness.
II.
Discussion
[¶9] We review a trial court's decision to
admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion or clear error. State v. Bridges, 2003 ME 103, ¶ 39, 829 A.2d 247, 258.
[¶10] A defendant is permitted to present
evidence tending to establish that another is responsible for the crime for
which he is charged, and the trial court must admit that evidence "if it is of
sufficient probative value to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
culpability." Id. (quoting State v. Dechaine, 572 A.2d 130, 134 (Me. 1990)). "The defendant must reasonably
establish the connection between the alternative perpetrator and the crime
through admissible evidence." Bridges, 2003 ME 103, ¶ 39, 829 A.2d at 258 (emphasis
in original). "Without such
evidence a defendant cannot be allowed to use the trial to conduct an
investigation that [the defendant] hopes will convert what amounts to
speculation into a connection between the other person and the crime." State v. Robinson, 1999 ME 86, ¶ 20, 730 A.2d 684, 688-89 (quoting
Dechaine, 572 A.2d at 134). "We have . . . upheld the exclusion of
evidence that is 'too speculative or
conjectural or too disconnected from the facts' of a defendant's prosecution." State v. Robinson, 628 A.2d 664, 667 (Me. 1993) (quoting State
v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167, 172 (Me. 1984)).
A. Swisher Letter
[¶11] Reese argues on appeal that the
contents of Swisher's letter should have been admitted as alternative suspect
evidence because the content of the letter was a statement against Swisher's penal
interest pursuant to M.R. Evid. 804(b)(3).[3] Reese never raised this hearsay
exception at trial and therefore has failed to preserve it. See
State v. Irving, 2003 ME 31,
¶ 8 n.2, 818 A.2d 204, 207 (stating that when excluded evidence is not
made part of the record and no further offer of proof is made, it is not
preserved for review).
Furthermore, the relevant portion of the letter does not exist, and
Reese's offer of proof as to what the letter said was speculation on his part
and inconsistent with what Swisher and the recipient would say.[4] Even if Reese had preserved this issue,
there was no showing that Swisher was unavailable. See M.R. Evid.
804(a);[5]
see also State v. Small, 2003 ME 107, ¶ 25, 830 A.2d 423, 429 (stating
that the first prong of the test determining the admissibility of evidence
pursuant to M.R. Evid. 804 is that the declarant must be unavailable as a
witness). Accordingly, the court
properly excluded evidence relating to the content of the Swisher letter as
inadmissible hearsay.
B. Cochran's
Threat
[¶12]
Reese argues that Reil's report of Cochran's threat to kill Cody should
have been admitted because it raises a reasonable doubt as to Reese's guilt by
making Brawn a more plausible alternative suspect, and Cochran, a second alternative
suspect.
[¶13] To the extent it made Brawn a more
plausible suspect, Cochran's threat was prima facie admissible. Reese, however, offered only Reil's
testimony about what Cochran said.
Reil was not the declarant.
See M.R. Evid. 801(b). Further, because the statement was
offered to create reasonable doubt, it was offered for the truth of the matter
asserted. See M.R. Evid 801(c). Accordingly, Cochran's threat was properly excluded as
hearsay. See M.R. Evid. 801(c) ("'Hearsay' is a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.").
[¶14] To the extent the statement implicated
Cochran as an additional alternative suspect, Reese did not present any
evidence establishing a reasonable connection between Cochran and the crime and
the court properly excluded it. See Bridges,
2003 ME 103, ¶ 39, 829 A.2d at 258.
The
entry is:
Judgment
affirmed.
________________________
Attorneys
for State:
G. Steven Rowe,
Attorney General
Donald W. Macomber,
Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally)
Lisa P. Marchese,
Asst. Atty. Gen.
6 State House
Station
Augusta, ME
04333-0006
Attorney for
defendant:
Andrews B.
Campbell, Esq. (orally)
Campbell Law Offices,
P.C.
45 Kaler Corner
Waldoboro, ME 04572
[1] Title 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(A) has since been amended by P.L. 2001, ch. 383, § 8 (effective Jan. 31, 2003), (codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(A) (Supp. 2004)). At the time of Reese's conduct, it read: "A person is guilty of murder if . . . [h]e intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another human being . . . ." 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(A) (1983).
[2] Reese also argues that (1) the State violated his due process rights by both failing to compare certain latent prints with a print found on duct tape on the victim and denying him access to a material witness; (2) his right to a fair trial was violated by a reference to a polygraph test; (3) the searches were so tainted with procedural irregularities and omissions that his federal and state constitutional rights were violated; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict; and (5) in his consolidated sentence appeal, the court misapplied sentencing principles. We do not discuss these issues because, after considering them, we find them to be without merit.
[3] M.R. Evid. 804(b)(3) provides:
Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another or to make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. A statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by a defendant or other person implicating both the declarant and the accused, is not within this exception.
Id.
[4] The youth officers never saw the contents of the letter and both Swisher and the recipient would testify that they were only speculating that Cody was dead.
[5] M.R. Evid. 804(a) provides:
"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the declarant's exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
Id.