Skip Maine state header navigation
Bourke et al. v. City of So. Portland et al.
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2002 ME 155
Docket: Cum-02-261
Argued: September 10,
2002
Decided: September 24, 2002
Panel: CLIFFORD,
RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
DAVID BOURKE et al.
v.
CITY OF SOUTH PORTLAND et al.
CALKINS, J.
[¶1] David Bourke and other members of the Willard Neighborhood
Association (plaintiffs) appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Humphrey, J.)
affirming decisions of the South Portland Planning Board and Board of
Appeals. We dismiss the appeal as
untimely.
[¶2] The Planning Board and Board of Appeals
approved the application of A.E. Brown Company, Inc., for site plan approval
and major subdivision approval for a ten-unit condominium development in the
Willard Beach area, to be called Beach Landing. The plaintiffs brought two appeals from those approvals to
the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B. The court entered its judgment affirming the two Board
decisions on January 17, 2002. The
docket sheet recites that copies were mailed to counsel on that date, but it is
undisputed that no copies were mailed.
The plaintiffs did not receive notice of the entry of judgment until
their attorney spoke to the clerk's office on March 15, and their attorney did
not receive a copy of the judgment until March 18. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on April 8,
eighty-one days after entry of judgment.[1]
[¶3] The plaintiffs' appeal is
untimely. A notice of appeal must
be filed within twenty-one days from entry of judgment, except that for
excusable neglect the trial court can grant an extension of time for an
additional twenty-one days.[2]
M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3), (5).
The plaintiffs did not receive timely notice of the judgment as required
by M.R. Civ. P. 77(d), but that rule further provides: "Lack of notice of the
entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal or relieve or authorize
the court to relieve a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed,
except as permitted in the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure." The appellate rules offer the
plaintiffs no relief; a twenty-one day extension of time would not have been
enough, and M.R. App. P. 14(c) does not permit a suspension of the time limits
of M.R. App. P. 2. The result under
our appellate rules is clear: the appeal must be dismissed.
[¶4] Our caselaw is consistent with the rules. Strict compliance with the time limits
of M.R. App. P. 2(b), formerly M.R. Civ. P. 73(a), is a prerequisite to the Law
Court entertaining an appeal. E.g.,
Lussier v. Oxford Dev. Assocs.,
1997 ME 117, ¶ 5, 695 A.2d 1188, 1189-90.
The limits are "unaffected by the failure of the party intending to
appeal to learn of the entry of judgment . . . even if such failure is caused
by the Clerk's omission to give notice of the entry of judgment on the
docket." Harris Baking Co. v.
Mazzeo, 294 A.2d 445,
451 (Me. 1972). Our unambiguous
precedents and the plain language of the rules require a dismissal of this
appeal.
The
entry is:
Appeals
dismissed.
Attorney for plaintiffs:
Thomas B. Federle, Esq. (orally)
Dyer, Goodall and Federle, LLC
61 Winthrop Street
Augusta, ME 04330
Attorneys for defendants:
Mary Kahl, Esq. (orally)
Corporation Counsel
P. O. Box 9422
South Portland, ME 04106
Natalie L. Burns, Esq. (orally)
Jensen Baird Gardner & Henry
P. O. Box 4510
Portland, ME 04112
(for A.E. Brown Company)
[1]
On the same day, the plaintiffs filed a
motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60 that sought
an order revising the date of entry of the decision and order from January
17 to March 22, the date it was mailed by the clerk to the parties. The court denied the motion and the plaintiffs
brought a timely appeal. Because
their brief does not allege any error by the court in denying the motion,
we dismiss the appeal from the Rule 60 judgment (which we consolidated with
the appeal from the original judgment) for want of prosecution.