Skip Maine state header navigation

Agencies | Online Services | Help
Daigle v. St. Laurent, attorneys and footnotes

Attorney for the appellant: F. Jay Meyer, Esq. (orally) Thompson, Bull, Furey, Bass & MacColl 120 Exchange St. P.O. Box 447 Portland, Maine 04112 (for Raymond St. Laurent) Attorneys for the appellees: Robert W. Kline, Esq. (orally) Kline Law Offices 75 Market St. P.O. Box 7859 Portland, Maine 04112 (for Daigle Commercial Group, Inc.) John D. Clifford, IV, Esq. (orally) Clifford & Golden 5 Maple St. P.O. Box 368 Lisbon Falls, Maine 04252 (for J.P. Malone Auction Co.)
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} Saufley, J., sat at oral argument and participated in the initial conference but participated no further. {1} . St. Laurent's apparent reluctance to deal with Daigle must be examined in the context of a lawsuit filed by St. Laurent against Green that was pending during this time. In May 1996, St. Laurent filed a complaint against Green alleging that when he purchased Meadowbrook, Green knew that Glidden, the anchor tenant, was struggling financially and would not be able to renew his lease. The complaint alleges that Green misrepresented to St. Laurent that Glidden was "a good and stable tenant." St. Laurent sued for damages resulting from (1) the decline in value as a result of the loss of the anchor tenant, (2) lost rent that it would have received from Glidden, (3) damaged relationships with existing tenants because of the loss of the anchor tenant, and (4) expenses to mitigate these losses. Daigle, Inc. contends that St. Laurent, in an effort to increase his leverage in settlement negotiations with Green, may have sought to prevent Green from learning that St. Laurent was, in fact, close to finding a potential seller. Daigle, Inc. alleges that because Green was a client of Daigle's, St. Laurent limited communications with Daigle so as to keep Daigle from informing Green about the potential sale and jeopardize settlement negotiations. St. Laurent eventually settled with Green in August 1996 for $200,000. {2} . St. Laurent argues that Daigle, Inc. cannot recover under the doctrine of promissory estoppel because the Daigle-St. Laurent agreement governed their mutual rights and obligations. Even assuming, without deciding, that Daigle, Inc. could not recover under promissory estoppel if a contract governed the actions at issue, the contract is not a bar to recovery here because it terminated March 14, 1996, and was not renewed. Consequently, St. Laurent's subsequent promises to Daigle that he "would always be protected" and that Daigle "didn't have to worry about a commission," and Daigle's subsequent reliance on those promises, gave rise to a theory of recovery on the basis of promissory estoppel. {3} . On appeal, St. Laurent also argues that a summary judgment was inappropriate because of additional facts, adduced at trial, that Andrews disclosed to Maloney his prior involvement with Daigle. Although St. Laurent never moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment after that evidence was introduced at trial, he alleges that the court erred when it failed to sua sponte revise the summary judgment. Rule 54(b)(1) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part: [W]hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties . . . . [A]ny order or other form of decision . . . which adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. (Emphasis added.) See Monopoly, Inc. v. Aldrich, 683 A.2d 506, 509-10 (Me. 1996). "Rule 54 requires no motion by a party before an order adjudicating less than all claims and rights may be revised." Id. at 510. Here, although the court could have revised the summary judgment for Maloney, Inc., the court did not err in not doing so. We note that although M.R. Civ. P. 54 does not require a motion by a party before an order adjudicating less than all claims may be revised, id., a party seeking a reconsideration of a motion for a summary judgment on the ground that evidence adduced at trial supports a revision should file a motion with the trial court. Cf. id. at 509-10 (court reconsiders a partial summary judgment when moving party filed motion for reconsideration). St. Laurent failed to do so here, and the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to revise the summary judgment order. Finally, in reviewing the court's order, we will consider only those facts before the court at the time it ruled on the motion for a summary judgment. See Emerson v. Sweet, 432 A.2d 784, 785 (Me. 1981) ("On appellate review, the evidence before the Superior Court must be examined to insure that the substantive law was correctly applied to that evidence in the context of a summary judgment motion."). Moreover, even if the court considered that Andrews told Maloney that he had previously worked with Daigle on the purchase of the Meadowbrook property, summary judgment was still appropriate.

Back to top.

Back to Opinions page.