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State v. King
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT			Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 1997 ME 85
Docket: AND-96-225
Submitted on briefs January 24, 1997
Decided April 29, 1997

Panel:  WATHEN, C.J., ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, and 
LIPEZ, JJ.


STATE OF MAINE v. WILLIAM KING

WATHEN, C.J.

	[¶1]  Defendant William King appeals from a judgment entered in the
Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Calkins, J.) convicting him of unlawful
sexual contact (17-A M.R.S.A. § 255 (Supp. 1996)).  Defendant argues that a
probation condition, imposed as part of his sentence, prohibiting contact
with children under the age of sixteen without the permission of his
probation officer is illegal and violates his due process rights.  Finding no
error, we affirm the judgment.
	[¶2]  Defendant argues specifically that the Superior Court exceeded
its authority in imposing a probation condition that prohibits contact even
with his own children without the prior consent of his probation officer.  He
cites our decision in State v. Coreau, 651 A.2d 319 (Me. 1994) in support of
his argument.
	[¶3]  The court's power to impose conditions of probation is governed
by 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1204 (1983 & Supp. 1996).  That section provides in
relevant part as follows:

1.  [The court] shall attach such conditions of probation, as
authorized by this section, as it deems to be reasonable and
appropriate to assist the convicted person to lead a law-abiding
life ....
	....
2-A.  As a condition of probation, the court in its sentence may
require the convicted person:
	....
M.  To satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the
rehabilitation of the convicted person or the public safety or
security.

	[¶4]  In Coreau, we held that the sentencing court abused its
discretion by imposing a "no contact" provision as part of its sentence. 
Coreau was sentenced for various crimes stemming from an incident in
Biddeford during which he subjected a fourteen-year-old girl to sexual acts
at knife point.  In addition, he inserted cocaine into her mouth and vagina,
threatening to kill her if she told anyone.  The court's sentence prohibited
all contact with any child under sixteen and the court declined to except
Coreau's own children from that prohibition.  Coreau, 651 A.2d at 320.  On
review, we noted that the general prohibition from contact with children
was "reasonably related to the crimes for which Coreau has been convicted,
furthers the rehabilitation process by reducing the risk of Coreau
committing further crimes against minors, and protects the public safety." 
Id. at 321.  We observed that requiring supervised contact with his own
children would also reduce the risk of future criminality and protect the
children.
	[¶5]  We then considered that the probation condition prohibited
Coreau from having even supervised contact with his children and held that
this element of the probation condition was "well beyond the language of 17-
A M.R.S.A. § 1204 and the purposes of probation." Id.  There was no
evidence that Coreau abused any of his own children or that his presence
would be psychologically damaging to them.  His wife had testified that he
was a good parent and that she intended to remain married to him. 
Supervised contact, we stated:
 
[e]liminates the risk of future abuse while at the same time
increasing the chances that the family will remain intact.  ...The
prohibition of any contact unnecessarily punishes his children by
depriving them of nonthreatening, supervised contact with their
father and jeopardizes their opportunity to benefit from a stable,
two-parent home environment.  ...Moreover, such a punitive
condition does nothing to further Coreau's rehabilitation and
reintegration into society.

Id. at 321-322.
	[¶6]  The propriety of any given probation condition depends heavily
on the facts of the case before the court.  State v. Smith, 573 A.2d 384, 386
(Me. 1990).  The present case is factually distinguishable from Coreau. 
Here, the defendant repeatedly abused the child who lived in his own home. 
There is no testimony that defendant is a good father.  Rather, there is
evidence that defendant's children and his living companion's other child
were sexually abused by defendant's half-brother and father.  The forensic
evaluation of defendant notes "[a]ll the children in his care have reported to
have been sexually abused by a family member.  This indicated that he has
not provided adequate supervision of his children across time." 
	[¶7]  The probation condition in the present case also differs from
that in Coreau.  It does not flatly prohibit contact between defendant and his
children but permits contact with the approval of a probation officer.  This
condition is similar to a requirement of supervision.  It permits contact
when appropriate but protects the children.  See Coreau, 651 A.2d at 322
n.7 (defendant should have presented the court with plan for supervised
contact or for contact in accordance with a plan satisfactory to the Division
of Probation and Parole).  The condition does not have the punitive nature of
the condition in Coreau; it is reasonably related to the crime committed,
furthers the rehabilitation process by reducing the risk of further crimes,
and protects the public safety.  The court did not abuse its discretion.
	[¶8]  Defendant's remaining argument is without merit.  His due
process rights were amply protected by the sentencing procedures in this
case.  Defendant was given notice of the possible imposition of the condition
and was provided with an opportunity to be heard at the time the sentence
was imposed.  Id. at 320 n. 2.
	The entry is:
					Judgment affirmed.
 
Attorneys for State: Norman R. Croteau, District Attorney Kevin J. Reagan, Asst. Dist. Atty. 2 Turner Street Auburn, ME 04210 Attorney for defendant: Sheila A. Cook, Esq. Law Offices of William Maselli 98 Court Street Auburn, ME 04210