Skip Maine state header navigation

Agencies | Online Services | Help
State v. Garrison
Download as PDF
Wordperfect 3
Back to Opinions page

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT					Reporter of Decsions
Decision:  1997 ME 89
Docket:  CUM-96-458
Submitted on briefs April 25, 1997
Decided   May 1, 1997

Panel:  WATHEN, C.J.,  ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, and RUDMAN, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE v. CHESTER GARRISON
RUDMAN, J.

	[¶1]  Chester Garrison appeals from the judgments entered in the
Superior Court (Cumberland County, Fritzsche, J.) following jury verdicts of
guilty on two counts of gross sexual assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253 (Supp.
1996), and one count of unlawful sexual contact, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255 (Supp.
1996).  He contends that the court erred in refusing to give his proposed
jury instruction on the issue of consent as a defense.{1}
	[¶2]  Lack of consent is an element of both the crimes that Garrison
was charged with violating.{2}   The court had already instructed the jury that
to find Garrison guilty of the crimes charged in the indictment, it had to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim had not consented to the
conduct charged.  Instructing the jurors to consider again the issue of
consent would have been unnecessarily duplicative.  The court properly
rejected Garrison's proposed jury instruction concerning the issue on which
the court had already adequately instructed the jury.  State v. Atkinson, 458
A.2d 1200, 1203-04 (Me. 1983).
	The entry is:
					Judgments affirmed.
 
Attorneys for State: Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney Julia Sheridan, Asst. Dist. Atty. Deborah Pope, Asst. Dist. Atty. 142 Federal Street Portland, ME 04101 Attorney for defendant: Robert S. Raymond, Esq. Box 2080, Great Island Brunswick, ME 04011
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} 17-A M.R.S.A. § 109 (1983) states, in pertinent part: 1. It is a defense that, when a defendant engages in conduct which would otherwise constitute a crime against the person of property of another, such other consented to the conduct and an element of the crime is negated as a result of such consent. . . . 3. Consent is not a defense within the meaning of this section if: . . . B. It is given by a person who, by reason of intoxication, mental illness or defect, or youth, is manifestly unable, or known by the defendant to be unable, to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the crime . . . . {2} For the charge of gross sexual misconduct, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Garrison "engage[d] in . . . a sexual act" with the victim, and the victim was "unconscious or otherwise incapable of resisting and ha[d] not consented to such sexual . . . act." 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253 (2) (D) (1983). For the charge of unlawful sexual contact, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Garrison "intentionally subject[ed]" the victim to "any sexual contact, and [t]he other person is unconscious or otherwise physically incapable of resisting, and has not consented to the sexual contact . . . ." 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255 (1) (B) (1983).