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Claims Against Attorneys
[¶31] In actions against attorneys, the statute of limitations begins to run "from the date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury," except in enumerated cases, when the statute begins to run upon the discovery of the cause of action. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 753-A. One such exception is "an action alleging professional negligence in the drafting of a last will and testament." Id. § 753-A(B). [¶32] The plaintiffs argue that their claims fall within the statutory discovery rule because their claims assert "negligence in the drafting of a last will." [¶33] We have recognized that statutes of limitation will be narrowly construed. See Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 1997 ME 207, ¶ 5, 701 A.2d 370, 372. Thus, we cannot, as the plaintiffs urge, construe the law firm's alleged negligence in its ongoing management and advice concerning the affairs of the Corporation to be negligence in the drafting of Learned's last will and testament. From all that appears, there was no negligence in the drafting of the will itself. [¶34] Plaintiffs also ask us to judicially construct a discovery rule for actions against estate planning lawyers. When the Legislature has given explicit directions as to when a statute of limitations begins to run, we are not "free to re-define the term" by the creation of a discovery rule. See Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Me. 1994). In addition, when the Legislature provides for enumerated exceptions to its definition, those exceptions "implicitly den[y] the availability of any other." Id. at 1202. [¶35] Had the Legislature intended that the will drafting exception to the occurrence rule in section 753-A should apply to negligence in drafting estate planning documents and the management of entities created as part of an estate plan, it could have said so. Accordingly, section 753-A bars application of the discovery rule to the claims against the attorneys. [¶36] The plaintiffs next argue that their claims against the attorneys are saved from the statutes of limitation by the doctrine of continuing representation. The doctrine of continuing representation "tolls the running of the statute in an attorney malpractice action until the professional relationship terminates with respect to the matter underlying the malpractice action." Smith v. Stacy, 482 S.E.2d 115, 120 (W. Va. 1996). [¶37] For the doctrine to apply, there must be a "clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney." Schoenrock v. Tappe, 419 N.W.2d 197, 201 (S.D. 1988) (quoting Muller v. Sturman, 437 N.Y.S.2d 205, 208 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)). Even if we might apply the continuing representation doctrine in the appropriate case, here plaintiffs have stipulated away any such claims by waiving claims regarding any representation in the period after February 1, 1989. [¶38] Application of 14 M.R.S.A. § 753-A bars the personal representative's claim against the attorneys.
The Beneficiaries' Claims
[¶39] The last matter for this Court to address is the beneficiaries' claims against Hale & Hamlin. The trial court determined that the individual beneficiaries lacked standing to make a claim against Hale & Hamlin because they were not clients of Hale & Hamlin and, therefore, lacked privity. [¶40] A number of the jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have determined that individual named beneficiaries of a will have standing to bring professional negligence claims against attorneys representing estates or preparing estate documents. See, e.g., Simpson v. Calivas, 650 A.2d 318, 321 (N.H. 1994) (citing R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 26.4, at 595 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992)). [¶41] When there is a personal representative to assert the financial claims on behalf of the estate, however, the better rule appears to be not to allow individual beneficiaries to assert claims for negligence. Otherwise, it is possible that a number of individual beneficiaries could assert differing and conflicting malpractice claims, and attorneys, in drafting wills and estate planning documents, could be presented with difficult challenges resolving conflict of interest issues with respect to named beneficiaries at times when they are drafting the documents. See Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Tex. 1996). In such instances, what is good for one beneficiary may not be good for another beneficiary or for the estate as a whole. A holding that attorneys have some duty, enforceable through a cause of action, to individual beneficiaries of estates, separate from their duty to the estate itself, could significantly add to the difficulty and cost of preparing estate planning documents and obtaining competent counsel to draft documents when there is a significant possibility of conflict among beneficiaries. Accordingly, we conclude that individual beneficiaries do not have standing to sue estate planning attorneys for malpractice when they are not the client who retained the attorney and when the estate is represented by a personal representative who stands in the shoes of the client. [¶42] Therefore, we conclude that: 1. The Superior Court ruled correctly in dismissing the claims by the personal representative and the individual beneficiaries against the law firm defendants. 2. The judgment of the Superior Court must be vacated and remanded for determination of the claims by all the plaintiffs against Union Trust. The entry is Judgment vacated in part and affirmed in part. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . The actual plaintiffs are Crocker Nevin both individually as a beneficiary of the estate and in his capacity as personal representative of the Estate of Jennie Fassett Learned, and Annie Chamberlain, Jane N. Guinness and Ethelbert Nevin II, individually as beneficiaries of the estate. {2} . This Court may consider a report: "provided that the decision thereof would in at least one alternative finally dispose of the action." M.R. Civ. P. 72(a). {3} . The record is unclear regarding the timing of the resumption of the gifts, the above statement is based on representations by counsel at oral argument. {4} . 14 M.R.S.A. § 752 states: All civil actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues and not afterwards, except actions on a judgment or decree of any court of record of the United States, or of any state or of a justice of the peace in this State, and except as otherwise specially provided. {5} . In its original order, the court granted a summary judgment effectively barring claims for acts which occurred prior to November 15, 1989. On plaintiffs' motion, objected to by the defendants, this was amended by the court, recognizing the tolling agreement, to move the bar date back to February 1, 1989. {6} . Myrick, which applied the discovery rule to 14 M.R.S.A. § 753, and overruled a prior decision, Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me. 228, 182 A.2d 660 (1962), predated enactment of the comprehensive law governing medical malpractice claims and time limits. See 24 M.R.S.A. §§ 2851 et seq. {7} . Anderson predated enactment of 14 M.R.S.A. § 753-A.
Attorneys for plaintiffs: Julian L. Sweet, Esq., (orally) Paul F. Macri, Esq. Berman & Simmons, P.A. P O Box 961 Lewiston, ME 04243-0961 Attorneys for defendants: James R. Wholly, Esq., (orally) George Z. Singal, Esq. Gross, Minsky, Mogul & Singal, P.A. P O Box 917 Bangor, ME 04402-0917 (for Union Trust Company) Kevin J. Beal, Esq., (orally) Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau, Pachios & Haley, LLC P O Box 9546 Portland, ME 04112-9546 (for Hale & Hamlin)